

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 LUSAKA 02202 201312Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----002061 201318Z /47  
O 201013Z JUN 78  
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8702

S E C R E T LUSAKA 2202

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: CF XA XJ CG RH SF WA  
SUBJ: SOUTH AFRICA POLICY: SHABA, SOVIET/CUBAN  
INVOLVEMENT

REF: STATE 153145

1. THERE ARE POTENTIALLY POSITIVE BENEFITS FROM CONSULTING WITH SELECT AFRICAN STATES PRIOR TO KHARTOUM ABOUT THE LIMITED NATURE OF OUR INVOLVEMENT IN SHABA. HOWEVER, WE HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT DOING SO AS PART OF A MORE AMBITIOUS PROGRAM OF ADVISING AFRICANS ON THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR AND METHODS OF RESOLVING AFRICAN PROBLEMS. IT STRIKES US THAT THE UNDERLYING THESIS IN AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S ARGUMENTS IS THAT THE AFRICANS ARE UNAWARE OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES OR IF AWARE DO NOT KNOW HOW TO GO ABOUT MEETING THEM. THIS WE BELIEVE IS NOT THE CASE. WE WOULD ARGUE THAT AFRICAN LEADERS, FULLY AWARE OF WHAT THEY ARE DOING, FOR WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE VALID REASONS MAKE WHAT THEY BELIEVE TO BE RATIONAL CHOICES BETWEEN VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES IN MOLDING THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES. FOR SOME THIS MEANS CLOSE IDENTIFICATION WITH THE WEST, FOR OTHERS WITH THE EAST AND IN SOME INSTANCES IT MEANS CHOOSING TO DO NOTHING BECAUSE THIS IS IN THEIR PERCEIVED BEST INTEREST. TO CHALLENGE THEM TO MEET WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES IN PROBLEM SOLVING IS TO RUN THE RISK OF ALIENATING THE VERY PEOPLE WHOSE SUPPORT WE SEEK.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 LUSAKA 02202 201312Z

2. AFRICAN LEADERS, PERHAPS NOT ALL, DEFINE THEIR POLICIES IN TERMS OF WHAT THEY CONCEIVE TO BE THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS. SOME ARE MORE ADEPT AT THIS THAN OTHERS; SOME ARE INCLINED TO LOOK AT ONLY THEIR SHORT TERM INTEREST WITHOUT FULLY CONSIDERING THE LONGER TERM CONSEQUENCES. MOST, IF NOT ALL, RECOGNIZE THAT THEIR PERCEIVED NATIONAL INTERESTS DO NOT ALWAYS COINCIDE WITH

THOSE EITHER OF THEIR NEIGHBORS OR OF THE BIG POWERS. WHEN THEY SEE A POTENTIAL OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO, AFRICAN LEADERS TRY TO MANIPULATE THE BIG POWERS SO AS TO CONVINCE THEM THAT THEY SHOULD SUPPORT THEM IN ATTAINING THEIR OBJECTIVES. THE "MODERATE" FRENCH-SPEAKING AFRICAN COUNTRIES' TACTIC IS TO IDENTIFY WITH WHAT THEY PERCEIVE AS AN UNDERLYING FEAR OF COMMUNISM RUNNING THROUGH THE WESTERN, PARTICULARLY NATO, COUNTRIES' APPROACH TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THEY CLAMOR FOR MORE ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT BY THE WEST IN PROTECTING AFRICA FROM THE COMMUNIST MENACE. COUNTRIES LIKE TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA ARE A BIT MORE SUBTLE, BUT THEY ALSO PLAY ON THE WEST'S FEAR OF COMMUNISM. THEIR TACTIC IS TO LINE THE U.S. UP ON THEIR SIDE IN BRINGING ABOUT MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THEY DO SO BY WELCOMING CUBAN-SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE. THEN THEY, ESPECIALLY KAUNDA, IMPLY THAT, IF THE WEST DOESN'T GIVE THEM WHAT THEY WANT (LIBERATION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA), THEY WILL GO ALL THE WAY IN SOLICITING COMMUNIST SUPPORT FOR THE FINAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE. WHEN ISSUES ARISE LIKE THOSE INVOLVING ETHIOPIA AND SOMALIA OR THE SAHARA, AFRICAN STATES CHOOSE TO DO NOTHING. THIS IS NOT BECAUSE THEY ARE UNINTERESTED IN PROBLEM SOLVING. RATHER, THEY KNOW THAT ANY SOLUTION ATTEMPTED IS LIKELY TO UNDERMINE THE FACADE OF AFRICAN UNITY AND FURTHERMORE COULD OPEN THE WAY TO OAU INTERFERENCE IN THEIR AFFAIRS. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO UNDER ESTIMATE THE CONCERN HELD BY INDIVIDUAL AFRICAN STATES FOR THE PREROGATIVES OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 LUSAKA 02202 201312Z

3. OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT THE AFRICAN STATES, FOR DIFFERENT REASONS, CLEARLY FAVOR THE STATUS QUO WHICH PERMITS THEM TO CALL UPON WHOM THEY WISH TO HELP THEM RESOLVE PROBLEMS. IF WE ATTEMPT TO ENCOURAGE AN AFRICAN CONSENSUS ON HOW AFRICAN COUNTRIES SHOULD SETTLE PROBLEMS, WE WILL FAIL BECAUSE THE BASIS FOR SUCH A CONSENSUS DOES NOT EXIST. A NYERERE CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO SEE SOVIET-CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA IN THE SAME WAY AS A SENGHOR LET ALONE A MOBUTU.

4. WE AGREE THAT SOME OF THE SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS ADVANCED BY AMBASSADOR YOUNG COULD BE USEFULLY EXPLORED WITH AFRICAN LEADERS BUT NOT OTHERS. AN OFFER OF A PLEDGE NOT TO INTRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO AFRICA WOULD SIT WELL WITH ALMOST ALL AFRICANS AS WOULD AN OFFER TO HELP EFFORTS TO SECURE THE ZAIRE-ANGOLA BORDER FROM OVERT AND COVERT ATTACK. HOWEVER, THIS LAST OFFER IS LIABLE TO BE STRONGLY RESISTED BY MOBUTU. URGING AFRICAN STATES TO TAKE THEIR PEACE KEEPING PROBLEMS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WOULD DO NO HARM. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE IN OUR INTEREST TO OFFER TO NEVER SUPPORT INTERVENTION IN AN AFRICAN STATE WITHOUT SEEKING SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSEMENT. THERE ARE TOO MANY UNKNOWN IN THE FUTURE WHICH MIGHT DICTATE U.S.

INTERVENTION IN OUR INTERESTS.

5. WE WOULD URGE THAT ANY CONSULTATION UNDERTAKEN WITH THE AFRICANS HAVE AS ITS PRIMARY EMPHASIS A STRAIGHTFORWARD EXPOSITION OF OUR CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET-CUBAN ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA. WE SHOULD STRESS THAT FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE THEIR ACTIVITY IN THE MILITARY ARENA IS A SOURCE OF INSTABILITY AND A POTENTIAL DANGER FOR AFRICA. THEN WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT, IN TERMS OF AMERICAN POLITICAL REALITIES, SOVIET-CUBAN ACTIVITIES WILL HAVE A BEARING ON WHAT THE U.S. CAN AND CANNOT DO TO ASSIST SPECIFIC AFRICAN STATES TO MEET THEIR PROBLEMS. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD BE IN LINE WITH DEALING WITH AFRICAN STATES AS EQUALS-- EQUALLY CAPABLE OF DECIDING COURSES OF ACTION IN TERMS OF THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS. CLINGERMAN

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 LUSAKA 02202 201312Z

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, NEGOTIATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 20 jun 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978LUSAKA02202  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780256-1058  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** LUSAKA  
**Handling Restrictions:**  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780640/aaaabivx.tel  
**Line Count:** 136  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 7650c785-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** 78 STATE 153145  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 28 apr 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 2286401  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** SOUTH AFRICA POLICY: SHABA, SOVIET/CUBAN INVOLVEMENT  
**TAGS:** PDEV, CF, XA, XJ, CG, RH, SF, WA  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/7650c785-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014